Recalling the common interests and objectives of the Soviet countries, I informed him that the unification of the Transcaucasian republics was initiated by the creation of a common department of Transcaucasian railways, a foreign trade union and a common economic council of all the Transcaucasian republics. That is why I told Mahmoud Shevket that the Transcaucasian republics must jointly sign an agreement with Turkey. [9] For the purposes of this Agreement, the term Turkey includes the territories contained in the Turkish National Pact and the Pact of 28 January 1920 (1336), as elaborated and proclaimed to the Turkish Parliament in Constantinople and subsequently communicated to the governments of all countries and to the press. The treaty, the original text of which is available online, contains no provisions that would create a legal basis for its expiry in 2021. In addition, it is said in the out of 25. In March 1993, the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourly Relations between the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Turkey signed that the parties „shall respect the treaties and agreements they have signed, including the Treaty of Kars of 13 October 1921“. „The Turkish delegation in Moscow categorically rejected our proposal to convene a joint conference with the delegations from the Caucasus. It is obvious that the Turks in Tbilisi want to achieve additional results that go beyond our direct influence,“ Chicherin noted. [4] Alexander Bekzadyan was also in favour of the joint participation of the three republics in their negotiations with Turkey; it appealed to the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan to follow that path. In April 1921, Turkish delegates attempted to conclude separate agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan in Tbilisi and Baku respectively, but failed to do so. The question of convening a joint conference was therefore on the table, although the Turkish side had regularly tried until September to present the thesis of the conclusion of separate agreements with the three Transcaucasian republics instead of a joint agreement.
Once the venue, time and structure of the conference had been determined, the Armenian authorities began preparations. As in the run-up to the Moscow Conference, it was hoped that, as a result of the negotiations, it would be possible to mitigate as much as possible the consequences of the disastrous agreements and to modify certain economic and political provisions in favour of Armenia. To this end, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia was convened in Yerevan on August 26, 1921. The demands of the Armenian side were discussed and summarized in a memorandum. The political part of the document noted that there was a need for border adjustments in the Surmalu region, referring mainly to the salt-mining areas of Koghb. The Armenian side hoped that this part would pass to Soviet Armenia despite the Moscow Treaty, because „Koghb is the only place from which Armenia can obtain salt without special means of exploitation. Salt is the only currency on the territory of Armenia that can allow the exchange of foreign goods. [13] In order to exert pressure, the Turks deliberately delayed their withdrawal from Alexandropol, despite the requirement of the Moscow Treaty. Kazim Karabekir, the commander of the Eastern Front of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, who had led the victory against the Democratic Republic of Armenia, wanted to postpone the withdrawal from Alexandropol until an agreement with Soviet Armenia was reached. The 8. In April 1921, Chicherin sent a letter of protest to Ali Fuad, Turkey`s ambassador to Moscow, stating that Turkish troops should immediately withdraw from Alexandropol. Chicherin`s telegram was in response to a statement by Turkish Defense Minister Kemal Fevzi that the Kemalist army in the Caucasus should play „the role of an element of balance.“ Chicherin warned that they considered these actions hostile.
The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 enshrined territorial losses so deep that even the Armenian Bolsheviks were worried and tried to explain to their counterparts in Moscow that the agreement could have catastrophic consequences. After signing the document, Alexander Bekzadyan, the People`s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia, wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Bolshevik Party of the RSFSR, Joseph Stalin, the People`s Commissar for Nationalities, and Georgiy Chicherin, the People`s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. Bekzadyan noted that as a result of the Moscow Treaty, the defense of Transcaucasia has become very difficult, with Armenia being the most vulnerable. Armenia`s two most important cities, Yerevan and Alexandropol, were no longer at a sufficiently safe distance from the border. Pro-Russian parties in Georgia often refer to the fact that the Treaty of Kars has an expiration date that ends on the 100th anniversary of its signing. However, it is not clear why 1921 is mentioned as the date of the abolition of the treaty, since there is no passage on the dates in the treaty itself. Remarkably, it is impossible to cancel it unilaterally, because Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have the status of a single party and the consent of the three countries will be required to cancel the treaty. It should also be noted that Armenia does not recognize the Treaty of Kars with regard to the border part. In 1992, Armenia refused to ratify the Treaty of Kars. However, the Treaty of Kars is crucial for Azerbaijan because of Nakhchivan. Moreover, there is no such passage authorizing Turkey to annex Ajara.
On the contrary, with the Treaty of Kars, Turkey recognized Georgia`s sovereignty over Ajara, which means that Turkey recognized Georgia`s full jurisdiction over Batumi and the Batumi District. The Constitution of Georgia (Article 3, Section 3) determines the legal status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajara. On the 30th. In June 1992, Georgia and Turkey signed a bilateral framework agreement on friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly relations between Georgia and Turkey. This framework agreement also mentions the Treaty of Kars as part of the mutual recognition of the borders between the two countries, while the two parties „undertake to respect all treaties and mutual agreements of the Treaty of Kars of 13 October 1921“ and „are guided by the fact that this treaty finally determined the border between the two countries“. It is clear from the minutes of the Security Council that India has formulated the principle, accepted the practical form given to it by the Security Council and participated freely in the negotiations on the modalities in question. However, when developments in Jammu and Kashmir made her doubt her chances of winning the referendum, she changed her position and argued that she would no longer be bound by the deal. Of course, she made a lot of arguments to justify the somersault. But although the arguments are legal or quasi-legal in nature, she refused to go to the World Court for comment on the case.
In this way, the dispute was frozen with catastrophic consequences, especially for Kashmir, with high costs for Pakistan and with not too happy results for India itself. .
Neue Kommentare